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B ooby-traps are designed to entice victims to per-form a physical action with an apparently harm-less object that hides an explosive device that leads to the device’s unexpected initiation. Many 
booby-traps are improvised explosives devices (IED) and fea-
ture some kind of bait targeted to exploit emotions and the 
anticipated actions of security forces or civilians, who will 
initiate the explosive device in close proximity. Baiting is de-
signed to attract attention and cause the victim to approach 
the IED. It is intended to pique curiosity or instinctual feel-
ings, such as the desire to help (bait in the form of a body or 
an injured person), to profit (financial bait), longing (booby-
trapped dolls used as bait in the Vietnam War), or those of 
honor and patriotism (using flags to lure soldiers to a device). 
Many booby-traps feature some kind of bait designed to 
lure bomb disposal personnel closer to an IED and, in do-
ing so, cause them to inadvertently step on a pressure plate. 
Other traps entice the victim to perform a physical action 
with an IED that will lead to its initiation, for example tam-
pering with objects, such as flags or even weapons stockpiles 
abandoned by the enemy or competing forces. Anti-lift and 
anti-handling devices can also be improvised from other 
explosive devices and create a hidden danger for explosive 
ordnance disposal personnel. Such devices are often used in 
conjunction with anti-vehicle mines to prevent tampering 
with or removal of the mine.  
On 17 February 2018, a booby-trapped Palestinian flag 
was planted along the Israel-Gaza border fence, east of the 
city of Khan Yunis. An Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) officer 
approached the flag to remove it from the border fence and 
was injured when it exploded as he laid it on the ground. 
The flag pole was booby-trapped with a victim-operated IED 
(VOIED), designed to initiate when the flag pole was tilted. 
The flag served as bait to draw in the victim (the IDF soldier). 
Dozens of Palestinian flags are removed from the border 
fence on a daily basis without incident, causing the soldier 
to perceive this item as not dangerous, lowering the soldier’s 
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Gaza border, 17 February 2018. 
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mindfulness to the inherent dangers of these items that appear 
seemingly-harmless. Attempting to exploit mundane military 
or demining routines that invite complacency and reduce alert-
ness among those who are being targeted for attack is a tactic 
utilized by terror organizations around the world. Using a weap-
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traps to assemble. This tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP) 
is known the world over and is considered a “classic.” 
On 28 September 2017, a Saudi Arabian soldier was report-
edly wounded while neutralizing a mine planted by Houthi 
rebels near the southern border with Yemen. Video footage of 
the incident reveals the attempted neutralization and the mo-
ment the mine detonated. The documentation shows the Saudi 
soldier attempting to neutralize a TM-62 anti-tank mine. 
After unscrewing and removing the fuze, the soldier next rais-
es the body of the mine, after which an explosion is heard. 
Upon closer examination, a lever can be discerned in the sand 
under the mine after the soldier picks it up, and a distinct click 
can be heard, followed a few seconds later by the blast. The 
anti-tank mine seems to have been fitted with a simple, im-
provised anti-handling device in the form of a hand grenade 
placed under the mine with its safety pin removed, with the 
weight of the mine holding the lever in place.
The use of grenades as anti-handling devices is one of the 
simplest types of such devices taught around the world, used 
in the military in various improvisation situations and in in-
structional manuals produced and disseminated by terrorist 
organizations. In the jihadi arena, there are instructional vid-
eos showing how to extract the delay element from time delay 
fuzes for immediate detonation.
In April 2013, a jihadi forum member published a Lebanese 
Hezbollah instructional video on how to make a booby-trap 
or anti-handling device with grenades. The instructor dem-
onstrates how to remove the grenade delay element, causing 
the grenade to explode immediately upon removal of the safety 
pin, without the usual three-to-four second delay. He then gives 
an example of how to use such a device to booby-trap a corpse.
Using hand grenades for anti-handling devices with mines 
was documented in a video circulated on jihadi forums in 
December 2012; the video depicted training exercises by a 
The soldier raises the body of the mine, a distinct click is heard, and what looks like a lever can be discerned in 
the sand under the body of the mine. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
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group of Syrian rebels called the Mujahideen Brigade, a local 
contingent of the former Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in the Latakia 
area of northwestern Syria. The video presents a practical les-
son as well as hands-on practice in mine laying, where the 
instructor explains the components and operation of a Soviet-
made PMN-1: a pressure-activated, anti-personnel landmine. 
In the video, a grenade is buried in a shallow pit, serving as an 
anti-lift device for the mine then placed on top of it.
On 8 August 2018, the Syrian rebel group Junud al-Sham 
published a video showing a training camp used by the group’s 
fighters. The video shows fighters training how to neutralize 
mines in the field. Additionally, one fighter demonstrates how 
to detect and neutralize a Claymore-type IED hidden in some 
bushes along a footpath, fitted with a pressure-release device 
in the form of a Russian-made grenade fuze with a tripwire 
tied to the safety ring and a grenade—with its safety pin re-
moved—planted underneath the improvised mine.
As previously stated, there are jihadi instructional videos 
showing how to extract the delay element from time-delay 
fuzes for immediate detonation. However, even without re-
moving the delay element, the surprise of hearing the faint 
pop of the exploding primer at start of the four-second delay 
period can catch a soldier or the targeted victim off guard, al-
lowing sufficient time for the grenade or grenade fuze to deto-
nate and cause the desired injury.
Explosive devices targeting bomb disposal experts are usu-
ally secondary systems that are hidden from view. In these 
cases, there may not be any discernible indication from the 
primary system that an additional system exists. In IEDs spe-
cifically designed to target bomb technicians, one or more 
components (the battery, telephone, or wires) is clearly visi-
ble in order to trick technicians into thinking that they have 
neutralized the initiation system or power source. Meanwhile, 
the secondary device is concealed, sometimes completely 
Removing the delay element from the Mk 2 grenade fuze and inserting it under a corpse. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
The grenade, without its safety pin, is planted under the mine and covered with soil, creating an anti-lift device. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
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Neutralizing mines. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
Detecting and neutralizing the booby-trap (grenade) from under the Claymore mine. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
Collection of fully-assembled IEDs comprising mines 
fitted with improvised pressure plates and anti-lift 
boxes, Falluja, Iraq, 2016. 
Image courtesy of Terrogence.
Al-Karma, Iraq, January 2016. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
Nineveh, Iraq, November 2016. 
Image courtesy of Terrogence.
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IS anti-tank mines, Al-Ramadi, Iraq, December 2016. 
Image courtesy of Terrogence.
IS anti-lift firing systems. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
Anti-lift switches used by IS Sinai Province. 
Image courtesy of Terrogence.
Anti-lift switches used by IS Sinai Province. 
Images courtesy of Terrogence.
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separated from the primary IED with an independent power 
source, while it actually constitutes an initiation system for 
both the primary and secondary device.
In June 2016, the beleaguered Iraqi city of Fallujah was fi-
nally liberated from the grip of the Islamic State (IS) after a 
month-long offensive. Workshops for the production of vari-
ous IEDs, mortar rounds, rockets, and homemade explosives 
discovered in the city were extensively documented by Iraqi 
Security Forces and the media. Alongside fully-assembled 
IEDs comprising mines and improvised pressure plates were 
white boxes. The purpose of these boxes was to serve as anti-
handling firing systems that would target deminers or bomb 
disposal personnel who would lift up the mine after first neu-
tralizing the improvised pressure plate. Since then, these 
white anti-lift boxes and other anti-lift switches have been 
documented on many occasions and in different regions un-
der the influence of IS.
IS has produced some mines with anti-handling features 
that are externally similar to their single-function, plastic anti- 
tank mines. These mines also have a similar interior to the im-
provised IS anti-tank mine, with a mechanical-pressure fuze 
located at the center of a concave metal plate inside the mine. 
Some of the mines also have a built-in pressure-release switch 
serving as an anti-handling device.
In order to avoid initiation by anti-lift switches and sub-
sequent injury, deminers and bomb disposal personnel must 
always be alert to the possible presence of anti-lift devic-
es and booby-traps when handling IEDs, mines, or any oth-
er ordnance or items that can be used as bait. Precautionary 
measures to prevent unnecessary exposure to anti-handling 
devices should be taken by counter-charging ordnance and 
mines by detonating the devices in situ, remotely pulling the 
device using a “hook and line” technique to negate anti-lift 
or tampering systems, or using penetrating technologies to 
inspect weapons or ammunition, which most commonly in-
volve mobile X-ray systems to determine whether containers’ 
inner contents are legitimate or suspicious. 
IS anti-tank mine with anti-lift switch. 
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IS anti-tank mines, Al-Ramadi, Iraq, December 2016. 
Image courtesy of Terrogence.
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